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This paper  argues  that  a  shift  from  an  intergovernmental  form  of  governance  to  a  supranational 
regulation form of governance, as is the case of EMU, may not only do away with the efficiency-
legitimacy  trade-off  but  also  enhance  the  democratic  quality  and  effectiveness  of  European 
governance in the monetary sphere. The emerging role of the European Parliament in enhancing the 
democratic  accountability  of  decision-making  in  supranational  regulation  (monetary  policy)  may 
prove quite powerful  with respect to avoiding such a trade-off and indeed improving efficiency, 
transparency  and  accountability  in  European  governance.  It  is  argued  that  the  democratic 
accountability of governance in the EU increased very much as the direct result of the making of 
EMU, that is, of the democratic delegation of executive powers to the ECB by the European Council 
and the EU Council of Ministers. That democratic accountability has also been substantially enhanced 
thanks to the emerging (and still evolving) role of the European Parliament as a principal of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). That new role of the EP materialised because of the change in the 
nature of delegation, i.e. the initial principal (the Council) delegated to an agent (the ECB) in order for 
the agent to control its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. That led to a change in the assignment 
between agents and principals. The new principal (still in the making one could argue) has also 
allowed  for  increased  participation  in  and  deliberation  on  the  discussions  about  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy by the ECB, contributing in this way to its greater transparency. 
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Most authors dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic deficit and 
the efficiency of the decision-making process in the European Union (EU) defend 
that  the  EU  would  have  to  opt  to  be  either  a  federal  political  union,  with  one 
government  and  one  parliament,  or  a  confederation  of  sovereign  states,  without 
majority-voting. 
In most of these analyses, the present role of the European Parliament (EP) 
has been somehow neglected. Most of the time, the EP’s role is only analysed as a 
potential  conventional  parliament  in  a  future  federal  political  union.  For  a 
considerable part of this literature and also for many EU observers and national 
politicians,  the  European  Parliament  has  “an  inferior  representative  quality”  and 
therefore it is argued that a parliamentarisation of the European Community (EC) 
system would not improve its democratic quality. 
By  the  same  token  (see  for  instance  Fritz  Scharpf,  2001,  and  Adrienne 
Héritier, 2002), the so-called Community method of integration is said to face an 
efficiency-legitimacy trade-off. It is not possible to increase the legitimacy of the EC 
system without decreasing its efficiency and vice versa. In other words, there is a 
trade-off between democracy and the European Union’s problem-solving capacity. 
According  to  Höreth  (1999),  the  quest  for  more  legitimacy  of  EU  governance 
appears to be a zero-sum game and reinforcing the input legitimacy of such a process 
could well reduce its efficiency. 
On the other hand, although other authors stress the fact that legitimacy in the 
European Union can also be obtained through delivering (see again Scharpf, 1999), 
from a normative perspective it can be argued that legitimacy cannot be reduced 
only  to  performance.  Notwithstanding  such  normative  objection,  some  output 
legitimisation,  one  has  to  acknowledge,  namely  reforms  such  as  Economic  and 
Monetary Union, can contribute to and benefit from input legitimisation
2. 
Increased input legitimisation - transparency and accountability - smoothes 
the  processes  of  agreeing  on  and  implementing  common  policies,  facilitating 
delivering.  (To  that  extent  the  way  in  which  the  term  effectiveness  is  used  is 
somehow more demanding than just the relation between input and output of a given 
existing system). The two processes are then cumulative in enhancing the democratic 
quality and effectiveness of governance in the EU. It is with that approach to input 
legitimisation and output legitimisation that the paper goes on discussing the well-
established  view  that  there  is  a  trade-off  between  democracy/legitimacy
3  and 
efficiency in the European integration process. 
                                           
2 The transformation of EU challenges into national political objectives, as in the case of EMU, are 
also  supported  on  some  input  legitimisation  that  involve,  through  a  mandate  and/or  national 
representatives, transparency and accountability and deliberation (public argument and reasoning). 
3 The concepts of democracy and legitimacy are generally used in an interchangeable way without a 
proper distinction and/or as communicating vessels, as put by Gustavsson (2002). Good examples are 
the official Nice and Laeken Summit declarations, the first talking about “the need to improve and to 






This paper aims at analysing how exactly European policy constraints and 
goals contribute to increase the democratic quality and effectiveness of governance 
in the European Union. In that perspective it discusses how processes (i.e. their 
democratic  quality)  and  the  system’s  effectiveness  in  terms  of  outcomes 
(formulation and implementation of policies) evolve in a political system such as the 
European Union.  
  For that purpose it looks at how the democratic quality of governance in the 
EU may enhance the effectiveness of the European integration process and/or of the 
policy-making process in the EU. In other words: how the joining-in of domestic and 
European factors in the process of coping with new challenges and of transforming 
them into new EU policy constraints and even objectives might bring about a change 
in will and/or attitudes, both at the European level and at the national level, that 
generate durable reforms. Conversely, it is also important to understand whether and 
how such challenges, policy constraints and European and/or national objectives as 
well  as  the  new  modes  of  governance  they  generate  contribute  to  enhance  the 
democratic quality, and legitimacy, of the European integration process.  
With that objective in mind the paper centres on the example of EMU, the 
making of its rules and the overseeing of the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy to 
see whether there is a trade-off between efficiency on the one hand and transparency 
and accountability (and participation and deliberation, one can add) on the other 
hand in the process of European monetary integration. 
While that example of supranational regulation may be subject to the above 
referred trade-off one has to acknowledge that the building-up of EMU could well 
have enhanced different forms of participation, namely by national parliaments and 
European  citizens.  It  also  represented  an  accountable  and  relatively  transparent 
power delegation of executive authority (from the European Council and the EU 
Council of Ministers to the ECB). If that is the case, and if there is no evidence of 
decreased efficiency in that process, one has to look elsewhere for that trade-off. 
The paper also investigates whether some of the characteristics of the process 
of European integration can be seen as solutions both for the increased complexity 
and  individualisation  of  modern  societies  and  for  the  on-going  process  of 
globalisation. This is because monetary policy may well have been beyond the reach 
of the democratic political system before centralisation (EMU). If that was the case, 
we depart from a non-zero-sum game: abandoning the intergovernmental mode of 
governance was then not even subjected to the legitimacy-efficiency trade-off. 
In that case, “elsewhere” is in the steady-state of supranational regulation of 
monetary policy, that is, the system since 1999. In fact, it was in 1999 that EMU’s 
third  phase  began.  Consequentely,  EMU  has  to  be  analysed  in  terms  of  its 
                                                                                                                     
derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects” (see Gustavsson, 2002). And yet we 
know that a process can be democratic but not legitimate and vice versa. This paper recognises the 
importance of legitimacy insofar as delegations of power are concerned but it focuses on democracy – 
how transparent and accountable governance is in the EU.  
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contribution to increased transparency and accountability (and also participation and 
deliberation) of the implementation of monetary policy by the ECB. 
An  additional  but  rather  central  question  (subject  to  efficiency 
considerations) that the paper tries to answer is as to whether and to what extent the 
European Parliament is fit to function in a (democratic) EU polity (in the making). 
Therefore the paper investigates the nature of the more important (and for some 
authors,  politicians  and  policy-makers  still  disputable)  role  of  the  European 
Parliament  as  a  principal  of  the  ECB.  That  is  to  say  it  analyses  the  European 
Parliament’s  increased  involvement  in  overseeing  the  Central  Bank’s  activities, 
aiming at understanding whether and how that new role has significantly affected the 
above referred trade-off (in the steady-state of supranational regulation of monetary 
policy). 
For  that  purpose  it  is  necessary  to  understand  whether  the  European 
Parliament can develop its role of principal (overseeing the activity) of the ECB 
without  putting  at  risk  the  credibility  (and  consequently,  effectiveness)  of  the 
European monetary authorities in the financial markets. Moreover, the paper tries to 
shed light on the extent to which the EP can divert political pressure by the various 
interest groups away from the monetary authorities towards itself.  
While  the  chief  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  our  analytical 
understanding,  some  policy  conclusions  are  also  drawn.  That  is  the  case  of  the 
importance of representative institutions, in particular the European Parliament, for 
the democratic quality of the European integration process and for the effectiveness 





In  order  to  analyse  the  efficiency-democracy  trade-off  in  the  process  of 
European  monetary  integration  and  to  analyse  the  democratic  quality  and 
effectiveness of Governance in the European Union, drawing on the example of 
EMU, this paper is structured as follows: 
The  subsequent  section  examines  the  issue  of  increased  centralisation  of 
policies and of political structures in modern societies in general and in the EU in 
particular. It also discusses the growing felt need for democracy in the EU and how 
its political structures, namely the European Parliament in its role of principal, may 
respond in the light of a balance between the criteria of efficiency, on the one hand, 
and transparency and participation, on the other hand.  
Section 3 discusses the importance of enhanced accountability as a way of 
improving the quality and effectiveness of European monetary integration. Enhanced 
accountability permits dealing with what is called below credibility and political 
constraints  without  reducing  the  legitimacy  of  the  European  integration  process 
and/or putting at stake the efficiency of its processes and the effectiveness of its 
institutions
4  and  policies  but  increasing  its  democratic  quality,  that  is,  without 
                                           
4  Throughout  the  paper  the  concepts  of  efficiency  and  effectiveness  are  used  in  an  almost  
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incurring into any trade-off between efficiency and democracy (transparency and 
accountability) and participation. A sub-section is dedicated to the new emerging 
(and evolving) role of the European Parliament. The argument is that the European 
Parliament is instrumental for making institutions such as the ECB more accountable 
and the process of policy-making more transparent and participated (by citizens, 
non-governmental organisations, national parliaments, etc.), and indeed also more 
deliberative, while guaranteeing a balance between processes and outcomes. 
Section 4 deals with the question of the qualitative change in the process of 
continuously evolving governance in the EU against the background of the growing 
individualisation of society and the complexity of issues at stake. It is argued that 
despite the inexistence of a European constitution and a European government, EU 
governance is not hindering European democracy but rather extending it by bringing 
in more transparency and increased participation of citizens in the formulation of its 
policies. This fact in turn facilitates the implementation of common policies, that is, 
their effectiveness. 
Section 5 centres on the example of EMU from the perspective of being able 
of  bringing  into  account  uncontrolled  forces  through  a  process  of  multi-level 
political negotiation capable of creating credible, long-lasting institutions.  It also 
discusses how the transformation of EU challenges into national political objectives 
in the case of EMU triggered a sustained change in political attitudes and in policy 
stances  and  hence  led  to  enhance  the  democratic  quality  and  effectiveness  of 
monetary policy and macroeconomic policy in general in most EU countries. 
Last,  section  6  concludes  on  how  the  interaction  between  representative 
institutions at different levels allows for more participated and transparent modes of 
governance  and  how  a  shift  from  the  intergovernmental  to  these  modes  of 
governance may enhance the democratic quality and effectiveness of governance in 
the EU, its state, likely future evolution and outcomes. It also concludes that in the 
case of EMU (supranational regulation) the democratic accountability of governance 
in the EU has been substantially enhanced thanks to the emerging and evolving role 






Modern societies have become more complex in nature. As a result of this 
increased complexity but also in the face of a growingly individualised society and 
the  process  of  globalisation,  the  traditional  mechanisms  of  a  parliamentary 
democracy seem not to be so satisfactory. 
At the level of the state, but as well at the EU level, the parliamentary system 
has to live up to a two-fold challenge, namely to be effective in the light of the 
growing  intervention  needs  of  the  state  in  a  complex,  permanently  modernising 
                                                                                                                     
interchangeable way but the former refers more to the processes that create institutions and the latter to 
the institutions that deliver policies.  
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industrial society and to be democratically legitimated, serving as an instrument in 
the political opinion- and decision-making processes. The fact and consequences of 
in particular bureaucratisation and oligarchisation are then at the centre-stage of the 
democracy discussion, due to the concentration of decision-making and power in the 
social and political system within ever larger organisational structures. 
According to Neumann (1950), in a given context, any political system can 
be analysed in the light of some formal criteria.
5 Let us bear in mind throughout the 
paper  the  three  most  relevant  criteria.  They  are:  efficiency,  transparency  and 
participation. Efficiency is the relation between benefits and costs (technical-rational 
economic  performance:  higher  benefits  for  the  same  costs  or  vice  versa); 
transparency  is  the  degree  of  disclosure,  important  for  control  and  indeed 
accountability; and participation refers to participatory observation, counselling and 
co-decision. 
Concentration  of  decision-making  in  some  institutions  in  modern 
democracies mirrors situations in which legitimate principals have delegated power 
to agents for the sake of efficiency. The process of delegation itself may, as for 
instance  one  can  argue  for  the  case  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  meet 
transparency and accountability requirements. However, those legitimate principals 
expect agents to carry out policies that are consistent with their initial preferences. 
Nevertheless,  for  different  reasons  (see  Elgie,  2000,  for  a  brief  review  of  those 
reasons), the agent’s actions may differ from the principal’s preferences. For that 
reason, transparency, in conjunction with accountability, is critical to ensure that 




As  far  as  transparency  is  concerned,  one  can  argue,  on  the  basis  of  the 
various examples given in subsequent sections of this paper, that monetary reform is 
already leading to greater transparency. Such enhanced transparency (and indeed 
effectiveness) of European monetary policy, improves the democratic quality of the 
European integration process.
6 
In  the  case  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  there  was  already  an 
increased (compared with the previous situation and in all EU countries with the 
exception  of  Germany)  degree  of  transparency,  accountability  and  indeed 
participation  (through  referenda  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty  or  through  public 
discussions at the occasion of several national and European election campaigns) in 
the  making  of  its  rules.  One  can  say  that  in  the  case  of  EMU  the  process  of 
delegation met some accountability and transparency requirements.  
However,  it  is  possible  to  improve  the  democratic  quality  of  monetary 
policy decisions by making sure that the agent' s actions do not differ from the 
principal’s preferences by means of enhanced transparency and accountability as 
well  as,  one  could  add,  through  some  kind  of  deliberative  processes  among 
                                           
5 These criteria are obviously to be analysed in a multi-dimensional perspective. 
6 This aspect is specifically dealt with in sub-section 5.2.  
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monetary policy experts with different perspectives on what should be the conduct 
of monetary policy.
7 
For agents to be held accountable, though, there is the need not only for 
transparency (which comprises the access to the necessary information) but also for 
enforcement mechanisms (see Kehoane and Nye, 2003, for a discussion of these 
issues).
8 This is particularly relevant for the case of the ECB in its relation with the 
European Parliament. 
In fact, although the European Parliament’s oversight of the ECB’s activities 
lacks enforcement mechanisms – as it cannot pass any laws which define the goals 
and tasks of the ECB (as the German Bundestag could do) – it has been able (as put 
forward  below;  see  also  Elgie,  2000)  to  develop  an  informal  (sometimes  at  the 
ECB’s own initiative to ensure broad political support, one can argue) but to some 
extent effective role in overseeing the ECB. The litmus test for that capacity (a 
serious crisis or conflict) has however not taken place yet.
9 
The  process  of  globalisation  made  the  tension  between  increasing 
complexity and the growing felt need for democracy in modern societies more acute. 
In fact, with globalisation, concentrated decision-making and larger organisational 
structures are well beyond the sphere of democratic influence of national social and 
political systems. Moreover, many of the various problems that modern societies 
face cannot be dealt with successfully by national political systems – let us think of 
monetary and financial instability, just to stick to our example (EMU). 
On the other hand, governments of different countries by getting together can 
only partly deal with such type of transnational problems, incurring in additional 
costs.  This  is  because  at  the  intergovernmental  level  the  process  of  reaching 
decisions is obviously more complicated: there are thus (very concrete) additional 
costs in terms of efficiency (concerning all the difficulties to reach agreement among 
governments,  to  get  then  the  approval  of  their  respective  parliaments,  etc.)  and 
citizens may feel even more acutely the need for more democracy, given the lack of 
transparency and/or the insufficient participation in that type of decisions.
10 In fact, 
one can argue that the inter-governmental level alone, while necessary for carrying 
on the European integration process both in terms of processes and outcomes, is 
                                           
7  See  Schürz  (2002)  for  a  discussion  of  the  issue  of  democratic  legitimacy  with  deliberative 
institutions for the case of the ECB.  
8 As discussed in Torres (1996) and in section 3 (3.2) the H[DQWH specification of the rules of the game 
(EMU) was not part of the Treaty of Maastricht that focused on entry requirement rather than on 
working rules.  
9 Regarding some EU common policies, such as environmental policy, there is already a much more 
important level of participation than in the case of monetary policy and also an increasing level of 
transparency due to the European co-decision procedure (see Torres, 2003). 
10 For Beate Kohler-Koch (1999) for instance, majority voting, although increasing the effectiveness 
of decisions in the EU at the intergovernmental level, infringes the sovereign right of the Member 
States  to  ultimately  decide  what  is  and  what  is  not  acceptable  to  their  national  constituencies, 
therefore  upsetting  the balance  between  the  three  Neumann  criteria.  Note  that  this  presupposes, 
however, that the state still had GHIDFWR sovereignty in the first place. By pooling sovereignty in the 
EU some Member States might at least influence some decisions that they could not affect before.  
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neither an efficient nor a transparent or a participatory way of governance in the 
European Union. 
In  the  European  Union,  where  regional,  national,  inter-governmental  and 
federal  structures  overlap,  the  tension  between  increasing  complexity  and  the 
growing felt need for democracy in modern societies is thus even more evident than 
at the national level. In the EU there is an on-going evolution in terms of sharing 
sovereignty that should raise efficiency. Stable forms of political cooperation among 
the EU Member States are hence (quite an important) part of the solution as a way of 
improving  efficiency  (and  therefore  output  legitimisation)  but  also  part  of  the 
problem in terms of transparency and accountability as well as participation and 
deliberative processes (input legitimisation). Given that in the EU responsibility is 
much more diffuse than in national systems, it becomes even more difficult to bring 
the  various  institutions  that  formulate  policies  and/or  take  decisions  at  different 
levels into account.  
The question then is how to address the identified democratic deficit in terms 
of democratic accountability and transparency (and participatory and deliberative 
processes one might add) in the EU. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001), discussing 
different  ways  of  making  policy-decisions  in  the  EU  more  accountable  and 
responsive  to  European  citizens,  identify  three  major  possibilities:  EU-wide 
referenda; direct elections for the president of the European Commission; and to 
operate more in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. While the latter is already 
enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the two other solutions may 
suffer  from  being  a  too  straightforward  extension  to  the  EU  level  of  national 
(different) practices (and traditions). More importantly, the growing complexity of 
political structures, especially acute in the case of the EU, sits uneasily with yes or 
no referenda (as was the case for Denmark, France and Sweden and it will be the 
case for the UK) and/or simple extensions of national practices beyond the nation 
state. 
According  to  Neumann  (1950),  the  only  criterion  for  the  democratic 
character of an administration is the full political responsibility (accountability) of 
the top of the administration, not towards single interests but to the whole of the 
voters,  by  means  of  responsible  representatives  (see  Steffani,  1973).  In  that 
perspective, it would be the European Parliament, or a possible European congress
11, 
rather than an inter-governmental body such as the European Council and/or the 
Council of Ministers of the EU that would act as the sole principal for the ECB and 
the  European  Commission.
12  The  EP  is  the  only  supranational  EU  body  that 
represents the whole of the voters. 
                                           
11 Habermas (2001, p. 99) sees a European congress, representative of both the European population 
and  the  EU  member  states,  as  a  necessity:  “...in  a  European  Federation  the  second  chamber  of 
government representatives would have to hold a stronger position than the directly elected parliament 
of popular representatives, because the elements of negotiation and multilateral agreements (...) cannot 
disappear (...) even for a Union under a political constitution.” Also the Economist’s proposal for a 
constitution  for  the  European  Union  of  October  28th,  2000,  provides  for  a  new  chamber  of 
representatives of national parliaments, the Council of Nations.  
12 In fact, an economic government, defended by several politicians, could interfere with the statutory 
independence of the ECB and it would not by itself add more legitimacy to the EU institutions in the  
 
8 
However, one has to bear in mind that such a change has to go hand-in-hand 
with both the principle of subsidiarity (enshrined in the Treaty on European Union) 
that also reflects proximity to the citizens (and DSULRUL should facilitate transparency 
and participation), and the democratic legitimacy of the EU vis-à-vis the different 
national governments, in the eyes of the European citizens.
13 
One  of  the  most  important  forms  of  political  action  in  a  democracy  is 
however  the  free  election  of  the  representatives.  This  presupposes  that  social 
structures (such as unions or parties) remain independent from the state and are open 
and  accessible  to  pressures  from  below  and  that  voters  can  get  together  to 
spontaneously solve difficult problems when they arise. At the EU level, there are no 
political parties (yet) capable of fulfilling that role. However, the collaboration of 
national organisations, such as non-governmental organisations and even national 
parliaments, with European institutions, such as the European Commission and the 
European Parliament, may partially fulfil that function. In this context let us consider 





In this paper the European Parliament is chosen to illustrate the point that it 
is  the  European  institution  that  comes  closest  to  fulfilling  the  functions  of 
responsible  representation  and  of  principal  for  different  other  EU-supranational 
bodies. 
In fact, the European Parliament is the representative institution at the EU 
level, directly chosen by the people. Thus, one can argue that not only in the case of 
EU-supranational bodies’ decisions but also in the case of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) where national governments may be outvoted in the Council, and therefore 
cannot be held accountable to national parliaments, the European Parliament can be 
seen  as  an  alternative  (to  a  certain  extent,  and  under  a  particular  perspective, 
complementary to national parliaments) for democratic accountability.
14 
By its very nature
15, the EP is also relatively open and accessible to pressures 
from below (and to lobbying, one might add), allowing for instance for citizens’ 
                                                                                                                     
eyes of the European citizens precisely because of its intergovernmental character. This is not to say, 
however, that more democratic bodies could not engage in power politics. 
13 In a way, that primacy of democratic decision-making in the conduct of global governance at the 
EU  level  may  also  provide  the  conditions  for  the  development  of  other  forms  of  democratic 
innovations  put  forward  by  different  authors.  See  for  instance  Michael  Saward  (2001)  for  some 
examples  of  new  forms  of  democracy:  cosmopolitan,  deliberative,  politics  of  “presence”  and 
“difference”, ecological redefinitions, associative and party-based direct models. 
14 According to opinion polls (see Eurobarometer, 56 and 57), in the EU the European Parliament is 
the institution, among the main EU institutions and agencies, which people tend to trust most on 
average;  exceptions  are  Germany,  Denmark,  Finland,  Sweden,  Austria,  the  Netherlands  and 
Luxembourg where the Court of Justice and/or the ECB tend to score higher.  The EP is also the best 
known EU institution (Eurobarometer 56, fig. 7.10) and it is perceived to play the most important role 
in the life of the EU (Eurobarometer 56, fig. 3.6). 
15 Different MEPs and Staff tend to listen and receive all kind of different experts and organised and 
non-organised interests as a way of negotiating and advancing their own proposals and reports. They  
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petitions  and  questioning;  it  also  somehow  facilitates  the  development  of  other 
emerging social structures, such as European parties or party families, independent 
from the national states, the Commission and the European Council.  
Moreover, the European Parliament, again as a representative institution, has 
a unique role in an overlapping political structure such as the European Union: it 
interacts more and more with the various national parliaments
16, bridging the gap 
between national and European representation; it is recognisably more open and 
accessible than any other European institution to pressures from below, allowing for 
an  increased  participation  of  European  citizens  in  the  Community’s  life;  and  it 
provides more transparency to the process of decision-making in the EU, permitting 
in that way to enhance the accountability of other European institutions, such as the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank, otherwise difficult to assure.  
In the case of monetary policies, this paper departs from the perspective, 
explained below and shared by other authors (see De Grauwe et al., 1998), that too 
informal an accountability may not guarantee lasting institutions. Also according to 
De  Haan,  Amtenbrink  and  Eijffinger  (1998)  the  trade-off  between  central  bank 
independence and accountability does not exist in the longer run. 
In fact, a central bank, continuously conducting a policy which lacks broad 
political  support,  will  sooner  or  later  be  overridden. As  discussed  in  section  3, 
politicians will tend to put the blame for the crisis onto the institutions that escape 
their control. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that not only it was necessary to 
assure a broad and long discussion about the objectives of EMU and the aims of the 
ECB prior to the launching of its third phase but that it is necessary to assure the 
proper (or at least some kind of effective and evolving) oversight of the ECB by an 
institution that is representative of the European population. Public opinion cannot 
play such a role because it lacks democratic legitimacy and the European Council 
and/or the Council of Ministers of the European Union have deliberately chosen not 
to control the ECB to avoid any misperceptions and/or any temptation of conflicting 
views over the implementation of monetary policy. 
  In the case of monetary policy (and even more in other cases, corresponding 
to  other  modes  of  governance,  such  as  environmental  policy),  the  European 
Parliament may well increase the efficiency of governance at the European level by 
smoothing out various resistances to the acceptance of some common policies. But it 
increases efficiency as a consequence of more transparency and participation and not 
at the cost of driving political decision-making further away from citizens. 
  This role for the European Parliament has been somehow neglected in the 
literature. Most authors dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic deficit 
and the effectiveness problem of the European Union, defend that it would have to 
                                                                                                                     
are  also  quite  open  (to  citizens,  the  media,  researchers,  etc.)  regarding  their  political  and  policy 
options. 
16  The  European  Parliament  holds  regular  meetings  with  members  of  the  relevant  national 
parliaments’ committees on a wide range of issues: EMU and hearings of the ECB’s President, the 
BEPG, the IGCs, EU enlargement, etc., not to mention the COSAC - Conference of European Affairs 
Committees of the EU (and applicant countries) National Parliaments and the European Parliament - 
and the European Convention.  
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opt to be either a federal political union, with one government and one parliament, or 
a confederation of sovereign states, without majority-voting. Some authors, such as 
Beate  Kohler-Koch  (1999,  p.  17),  argue  that  the  European  Parliament  has  “an 
inferior  representative  quality”  and  claim  that  there  is  a  broad  consensus  in  the 
scientific community that a parliamentarisation of the European Community (EC) 
system would not improve its democratic quality.
17 
Without entering into more normative type of arguments, one can argue, 
however,  that  the  representative  quality  (of  the  European  population)  of  the 
European Parliament is also evolving. It is argued in the next section and throughout 
the paper that the European Parliament has been assigned new roles in the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities by the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties 
and  that  this  fact  is  certainly  perceived  by  the  European  public  opinion  or  the 
different Member States’ public opinions, as shown by the polls referred above.
18 
That  fact  was  certainly  perceived  by  all  national  parliaments  that  ratified  those 
treaties.  
Even  with  an  “inferior”  representative  quality,  in  the  view  of  different 
authors  and  observers  of  the  EU,  the  European  Parliament’s  overseeing  of  EU 
institutions, such as the ECB, clearly contributes to an increased transparency and 
accountability of the system. Moreover, the interaction and collaboration between 
the European Parliament and national parliaments in the EU may allow for increased 






Let us consider why is it important to enhance the role of a representative 
institution (even though for some authors with still an inferior representative quality) 
as  principal  of  other  institutions  in  the  EU.  One  can  say  that  it  is  important  to 
enhance the role of a representative institution for the simple reason that, as referred 
above, the full political responsibility of the top of the administration, not towards 
single  interests  but  to  the  whole  of  the  voters,  by  means  of  responsible 
representatives, is if not the only (as defended by Neumann, 1959), nevertheless an 
important  criterion  for  the  democratic  character  of  an  administration.  In  that 
perspective, the European Parliament rather than an inter-governmental body such as 
the European Council and/or the Council of Ministers of the European Union should 
act as principal for EU-wide institutions, such as the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission.  
                                           
17 This “inferior representative quality” of the European Parliament is in general attributed on the basis 
of the “inferior quality” of European elections (disputed not on European but on domestic political 
grounds and with very low turnouts and different national voting rules and party lists) and of the lack 
of clear political and ideological cleavages (MEPs remain rather technocratic). 
18 Regarding knowledge about the EP, how it is perceived to play the most important role in EU life 
and how it is the institution which on average people tend to trust most in the EU (Eurobarometer, 56).  
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The European Parliament, as it does not necessarily follow the changing 
views of the initial principal, i.e. the European Council, may be particularly suited, 
and still enjoy the legitimacy (conferred by the treaties signed by the various EU 
national governments and ratified by all EU national parliaments), to oversee the 
activities  of  the  ECB.  The  European  Parliament  might  indeed  provide  a  good 
balance between, on the one hand, the “tying of its own hands” by the European 
Council, extended to the EU Council of Ministers, and, on the other hand, the need 
to assure and enhance if not the proper at least some accountability and transparency 
of procedures of the ECB’s administration, allowing at the same time for some form 
of deliberation. 
According  to  Jonathan  Bradbury  (1996,  p.  1)  in  the  Oxford  Concise 
Dictionary  of  Politics,  accountability  is:  “the  requirement  for  representatives  to 
answer  to  the  represented  on  the  disposal  of  their  powers  and  duties,  act  upon 
criticisms  or  requirements  made  of  them,  and  accept  (some)  responsibility  for 
failure, incompetence or deceit”. The concept thus requires sanctions or enforcement 
mechanisms as already mentioned above and discussed below for the case of the 
lacking H[DQWH specifications (working rules) of EMU. Note that there are other 
notions of accountability that do not necessarily require democratic accountability. 
An agency can be accountable to the markets (investors), to a dictator, to specific 
groups,  etc.  Keohane  and  Nye  (2003)  distinguish  between  several  categories  of 




Let  us  now  introduce  what  it  is  an  important  distinction  in  order  to 
characterise  the  importance  of  accountability  in  general  and  of  the  European 
institutions in particular. Accountability is necessary to achieve agreement on the 
design  and  establishment  of  lasting  institutions.  In  fact,  if  institutions  are  not 
accountable  one  might  well  solve  a  short-term  problem  of  creating  independent 
institutions but not the longer-term problem of their sustainability. 
Elected  politicians  will  only  defend  independent  institutions,  namely  the 
ECB, in the case of crisis, say an economic recession in the Euro zone, if they can at 
least oversee their functioning. Paul De Grauwe (De Grauwe et al, 1998) goes even 
further in saying that “politicians will be willing to defend the independence of the 
central bank only if they know that they have the ultimate power to control the 
central  bank”.  If  that  is  not  the  case  a  disruption  might  well  occur  because 
“ultimately politics rules”. 
Even in the very special case of Germany – where the monetary authorities 
enjoyed broad support – one can argue that the Bundesbank could not follow its way 
at very (indeed the most) important occasions of post-war German monetary history 
(see the examples provided by the EMS, German Monetary Unification and EMU). 
Politicians will tend to put the blame for the crisis onto the institutions that escape 
their control and these will have to resist (if they can) alone all the pressures for a 
change of their policy stance. Only by becoming accountable, independent central  
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bankers  will  ensure  the  political  support  that  they  will  need  for  their  long-term 
survival.  
The distinction I want to introduce is based on the literature of a new theory 
of economic policy that became popular in the late 1980s / early 1990s – see Torres, 
1992, for a discussion. That distinction is between two types of constraints faced by 
policy-makers: credibility constraints and political constraints. Credibility constraints 
concern the temptation of policy-makers to deviate from their initial plans, without 
any  disagreements  over  the  ultimate  goals  of  policy.  Political  constraints  regard 
conflicts of interest over those goals.
19 
Governments,  besides  being  subject  to  the  constraint  of  their  lack  of 
knowledge about the functioning of the economy, face as well explicit credibility 
and political constraints. As a result, policies are the outcome of the government’s 
optimization  problem:  the  maximization  of  a  well-specified  objective  subject  to 
those binding constraints. This approach translates, in the literature, into a number of 
positive  models  of  economic  policy  in  alternative  institutional  settings.  These 
different environments vary from monetary and/or fiscal regimes and reforms (which 
in general parallel rules versus discretion) to changes in government colour and 
organization (elections, simple majority, multi-party coalitions, etc.) and determine 
the credibility and political constraints that policy-makers face. 
In the case of monetary policy the European Union already deals with the 
credibility constraints that national and European policy-makers face by “tying their 
hands”.
20 Therefore, the functioning of European monetary institutions should be 
free of political interference in the sense that they should be granted autonomy, as is 
the  case  of  the  ECB.  That  is  however  only  a  way  of  dealing  with  credibility 
constraints. 
Given that political constraints regard conflicts of interest over the ultimate 
goals of policy, the creation of European institutions should also take into account 
those possibilities of disagreement. In the EU, that happened already in the case of 
the creation of Economic and Monetary Union and the ECB, through nation-wide 
referenda, several national and European elections where discussions about EMU 
were  a  major  issue in the  electoral  campaigns, and  many  public  debates  on  the 
matter. The process of making the rules of EMU (that also govern the ECB) was 
subject to democratic accountability, as argued above. 
With that clarification between credibility and political constraints made, one 
can perhaps better understand the importance of enhancing the accountability of the 
European institutions, in particular the accountability of the ECB. The European 
Council wanted to “tie its hands” and make Europe’s central bank independent from 
                                           
19 The idea of binding political constraints stems from the political business cycle literature, where 
governments have opportunistic incentives to adopt certain policies (for instance, in order to be re-
elected), and from the theory of public choice, where there are conflicting policy preferences among 
different  interest  groups (because  politicians  and bureaucrats  maximise  their  welfare  rather  than 
pursuing  public  interest)  and/or  the  so-called  agency  and/or  principal  drift  in  principal-agent 
problems (Elgie and Jones, 2000). 
20  For  the  classical  example  of  tying  hands  as  a  solution  to  the  time-consistency  problem,  see 
Homer’s Odyssey: Ulysses asking to be tied to the ship’s mast in order to be able to listen to the 
sirens while resisting to the temptation to try to join them. See Elster (1984) and Torres (1987, 1989).  
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any political influences. This was a way of dealing with credibility constraints and 
the problem of time-consistency (see Torres, 1989). 
However, avoiding excessive politicisation of agencies (in order to avoid that 
policy  outcomes  are  determined  by  vested  interests)  removes  them  from  direct 
political  control  (they  may  become  “fiefs  of  their  own”  not  responsive  to  any 
principal,  or  develop  a  cosy  relationship  with  those  whom  they  are  to  regulate, 
Caporaso, 2003: 13; see also Gustavsson, 2002, for a discussion). That is why the 
European Union has also to deal with political constraints, that is, it has to assure that 
its  institutions,  namely  its  central  bank,  are  accountable.  This  need  for  the 
accountability of EU institutions involves in the case of the European monetary 
authorities three dimensions put forward by De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger 
(1998),  namely:  decisions  about  the  ultimate  objectives  of  monetary  policy; 
transparency  of  actual  monetary  policy;  and  who  bears  final  responsibility  with 
respect to monetary policy. 
One  question  is  then  how  to  improve  the  ECB’s  accountability  without 
undermining its credibility in the financial markets. The answer developed below is 
that the European Parliament should have an enhanced role as principal of the ECB. 
Similarly, an enhanced role of the European Parliament in the formulation of policy 
decisions and/or at the EU legislative process may well improve (and is already 
improving, one can argue) the efficiency of common EU policies and the democratic 
quality of the process of European integration. Again, democratic quality meaning 
here the degree of accountability and the level of transparency and participation at 




It is true that with the ECB, the act of delegation of power was undertaken by 
the  heads  of  state  and  government  in  the  constitution  of  an  Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) on behalf of the Member States. Yet, as put by De Haan et al. 
(1998), this one-time act of legitimisation cannot replace mechanisms of democratic 
accountability. As a matter of fact, from a normative viewpoint, such a delegation of 
powers  to  unelected  officials may  only  be  acceptable in  a  democratic  society  if 
central  banks  are  one  way  or  another  accountable  to  democratically  elected 
institutions.  
Moreover,  one  can  say  that  the  European  Parliament  does  lie,  although 
somehow ambiguously, along the chain of delegation between the European Council 
and the ECB (so it was established in the TEU). In fact, one can argue that the 
European Parliament may act as a principal under implicit delegation from popular 
sovereignty (i.e. moving beyond the initial chain of delegation referred above and 
building up a new one). On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the Member 
States  have  not  only  intentionally  chosen  to  give  autonomy  to  the  monetary 
authorities  (in  order  to  deal  with  credibility  constraints)  but  that  they  have  also 
delegated authority to the European Parliament to act on their behalf as principal in 
relation to the European Central Bank (in order to deal with political constraints).  
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In  fact,  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  that  established  the  European  monetary 
constitution and which was ratified by all national parliaments gave the European 
Parliament  significant  competencies.  According  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European Community (TEC), Article 113 (3) of the Amsterdam Treaty, the ECB’s 
president should present the annual report to the European Parliament. Moreover, the 
Parliament could hold a general debate on that basis and the ECB Executive Board 
could  also  be  requested  and/or  take  the  initiative  to  be  heard  by  the  competent 
committees. Finally, the European Parliament has to be consulted by the European 
Council upon the nomination of the entire Executive Board (TEC, Article 112(2b)). 
One can then argue that the intention of delegating power to an independent 
central bank in the EU went hand-in-hand with the very idea of assigning to the 
European Parliament a new (and evolving) role. This is true even if the delegation of 
power  to  unelected  officials  (central  bankers)  in  general  does  not  lack  by  itself 
democratic legitimacy that can be found in the legal status of central banks by an act 
of Parliament (by a treaty ratified by national parliaments in the case of the ECB). 
Therefore,  the  idea  that  the  European  Parliament  was  assigned  a  new 
(evolving) role regarding the overseeing of the ECB goes without contesting the 
legitimacy of the European Council and/or the EU Council of Ministers and the fact 
that it can act on behalf of popular sovereignty. Without contesting the proximity of 
the European Council (heads of state and government, as representatives of Member 
States governments and peoples) as the initial principal of the ECB, it is possible to 
indicate ways of improving democracy and indeed efficiency in the EU, that in fact 
are already at least partly taking place.  
Let us follow what might have been the reasoning of the builders of EMU. 
One can then say that in order to deal with the credibility constraints that monetary 
authorities that do not enjoy yet a solid reputation of sticking to their announced 
goals  (the  above-mentioned  time-consistency  problems)  face,  the  principal  (the 
European Council together with the EU Council of Ministers) delegated to an agent 
(the new European monetary authority) in order for the agent to control its behaviour 
with regard to monetary policy. 
Such a change in the nature of delegation, however, one can put forward, 
implied a new role for the European Parliament, in fact a change in the assignment 
of agents and principals. From a normative point of view, one can also argue that it 
would have been undemocratic if the agent (the ECB) had remained in control of the 
behaviour  of  future  principals  (the  European  Council  and/or  the  EU  Council  of 
Ministers).
21 That is why leading politicians and national governments in the EU 
have defended an economic government as a counterweight to the ECB.
22 
                                           
21 This claim parallels the normative claim referred to by Elgie and Jones (2000) that the preferences 
of both the principal and the agent should remain in line. The positive claim, that is also underlying to 
agency drifting, that their preferences are bound to diverge stresses the need for some  form of 
oversight. 
22 The sub-optimality of the ECB’s accountability has been recognised by several authors. See for 
instance De Haan et al. (1998), De Grauwe et al. (1998) and Harrison (2001). This latter author 
concludes however that, because of the relatively high degree of transparency of the ECB and the 
strength  of  its  commitment  technology,  that  sub-optimality  should  not  impact  on  “its  effective 
framework for success”.  
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The initial principal (the European Council) did delegate to an agent but also 
established  new  (potential)  mechanisms  of  democratic  H[ SRVW  control,  namely 
monitoring and oversight, which can raise the quality of the democratic process in 
the EU without affecting the credibility of monetary policy in the financial markets 
and among economic agents in general. As a matter of fact, one can argue that the 
initial principal tied its own hands (and the hands of the Council of Ministers) but 
assigned a new role to a new principal (the European Parliament). 
This is all the more relevant given that clear H[DQWH specification of the rules 
of Economic and Monetary Union was not part of the Treaty of Maastricht and/or 
Amsterdam. The stability pact is an intergovernmental solution to strengthen the 
enforcement mechanism of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). Alternative rules 
concerning the allocation of resources and voting mechanisms within the ECB, the 
re-design of the System of European Central Banks in an attempt to make it more 
stable, and even the enforcement of a mechanism that would allow for the removal 
of the ECB’s Board of Directors should it fail to maintain price stability are neither 
defined in the treaties nor at the intergovernmental level (see Torres, 1996).  
It is in this perspective without a clear H[DQWH specification of the rules of the 
game – namely without an enforcement mechanism (whose inexistence was already 
discussed above) –, that the European Parliament may well oversee the activity of 
the ECB. That role of oversight does not endanger the credibility of the European 
monetary authorities because there is no need for a treaty change.
23 Furthermore, 
EMU can indeed work more effectively and smoothly if political pressure from the 
various interest groups is directed away from the European Central Bank (ECB) 
towards an institution that represents the entire European population. As defended in 
Torres  (1996),  the  easiest  way  to  secure  that  goal  while  preserving  the  ECB’s 
independence  seems  to  be  to  recognise  and  enhance  the  role  of  the  European 
Parliament - to which, among other European bodies, the ECB already reports
24 - in 
overseeing the ECB’s activity. 
In fact, an institution that is representative of the European population and 
attaches more weight to long-term objectives (not in the least place because of less 
immediate electoral concerns), safeguarding the well-being of all Europeans, could 
better fulfil the role of a principal on whose behalf the ECB should conduct its 
policies than the European Council that is also driven by short-term (electoral cycle) 
considerations.
25 
In fact, the European Parliament cannot be so directly influenced by the 
electoral  concerns  of  one  or  two  governments  in  the  EU.  This  is  because  the 
opposition to those governments is also represented in the EP and may well have 
different (if not opposing) views on the issue under discussion and because even 
                                           
23 As put by Elgie (2000), in the case of the ECB, any renegotiation of the set of H[DQWH controls is 
unrealistic and even if the Treaty could be reformed that would undermine its very credibility.  
24 See article 109b of the Maastricht Treaty, now Article 113 of the TEC after the Amsterdam Treaty 
was ratified by all national parliaments. 




larger countries cannot influence the EP to the extent that they do influence the 
European Council or the Council of Ministers.
26. 
The role of principal of such an institution as the European Parliament is 
consistent  with  a  principal-centred  perspective  (principal  drift)  of  principal-agent 
problems (Elgie and Jones, 2000) that is indeed particularly adequate to analyse 
situations that involve credibility constraints or time-consistency problems as in the 
case of monetary policy. It is also consistent with an approach that takes into account 
the  possibility  of  a  simultaneous  drift  by  the  agency  (the  ECB)  and  the  initial 
principal  (the  European  Council).  The  European  Parliament,  as  it  does  not 
necessarily share the potentially drifting views of the initial principal, the European 
Council, is particularly suited to oversee the activities of the ECB.   
The increased involvement of the European Parliament in the oversight of 
the ECB’s activities has already been quite substantial. Besides having managed to 
obtain the ECB’s Board of Director’s agreement on the presence of its President four 
times  a  year  in  the  appropriate  committee  (the  Committee  on  Economic  and 
Monetary Affairs), the European Parliament also holds meetings both with members 
of the relevant committees of the national parliaments and with experts to prepare 
those hearings.
27  
According  to  Elgie  (2000),  there  is  also  evidence  that  the  European 
Parliament has managed to “encourage” the ECB to not exclusively focus on its 
primary  objective,  price  stability,  but  also  pay  more  attention  to  its  secondary 
objective: to support the objectives of the EU as stipulated in the Treaties (Article 2 
of the TEU and of the TEC), namely sustainable development and employment (i.e. 
growth).
28 This may also be seen as a way of influencing EU policy constraints by 




                                           
26 In fact, a study by Simon Hix (2001) for the first year of the 1999-2004 European Parliament 
concluded that transnational party group affiliation was more important than national affiliation for 
determining how MEPs vote. In that perspective, it is not to be expected that say the German or 
Portuguese opposition would come to rescue their respective countries from an early warning. 
27 The first of those meetings - proposed by a national Member of Parliament and a  Member of the 
European  Parliament  at  the  May  1998  London  COSAC,  one  of  the  bi-annual  meetings  of  the 
Conference  of  European  Affairs  Committees  of  the  EU  National Parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament - took place in Brussels on November 3, 1998. 
28 That may well show, in the terminology of Farrell and Héritier (2002), the importance of the 
effects of an informal institution on the interaction between the European Parliament and the ECB. 
While these authors refer to empirical evidence indicating that such informal institutions have an 
important effect on interactions between the European Parliament, the European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers, I focus here on the importance of the effects of such informal institutions on 
interactions between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank (see Elgie, 2000, for 
evidence) and also between the European Parliament and national parliaments with respect to EMU 






The process of European integration is a good example of how different 
challenges  posed  by  an  evolving  (“ever  closer”)  political  co-operation  may 
contribute to achieve a model of sustainable development that is compatible with the 
other objectives enshrined in the treaties.
29 The concept of sustainability implies that 
development is bound by some limits that, if surpassed, may cause its reversal. One 
can also argue, on the basis of the arguments put forward in the previous section, that 
a  development  process  may  be  reversed  if  based  upon  non-democratic  (and/or 
unaccountable) institutions. 
Evolving political co-operation has been increasingly subject to a multi-level 
political negotiation process in the EU. That process comprises, among others, co-
decision and all ensuing EU directives and legislation in general, the discussion and 
approval of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (an increasingly important tool 
of  soft  policy  coordination  in  EMU,  supporting  a  more  deliberative  way  of 
governance),  the  new  open  method  of  coordination  (OMC),  the  new  European 
Council Spring meetings, all sorts of European and national recommendations and 
parliament  resolutions,  the  adoption  of  summit  agendas  and  conclusions  and  of 
European  strategies  and  white  papers  and,  quite  importantly,  the  domestic  and 
European debate that takes place. 
More  recently  (since  the  Amsterdam  Treaty),  even  intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs), convened to revise the treaties, are increasingly characterised by 
multi-level  political  negotiations.  In  fact,  these  intergovernmental  conferences 
include representatives of the European Parliament that is regularly briefed by the 
negotiators and can give its views on the issues under discussion. Moreover, the 
European Parliament’s views on the IGCs are increasingly important in shaping the 
European  public  opinion  on  these  matters  and  therefore  the  inter-governmental 
negotiation process. 
National parliaments, too, participate in that process. Not least, they retain 
the ultimate power of ratifying the treaties. Moreover, they also participate in the 
process  through  regular  hearings  with  national  (and  other)
30  IGC  negotiators, 
through  bilateral  and  multilateral  meetings  with  the  European  Parliament’s 
Constitutional Committee and through internal and open discussions (increasingly 
with representatives of the Civil Society) and resolutions. The European Convention 
of  2002/03  was  the  maximum  exponent  of  the  (multi-level) 
involvement/participation of many parties in such a process. It is through such a 
                                           
29 The objective of sustainable development was enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, Article 
2, by the Amsterdam Treaty. 
30 It is rather frequent that national parliaments (European Affairs Committees) invite members of 
other national governments for hearings on the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in order to 
discuss their points of view. These invitations are in general accepted. Several national governments 
(represented by their foreign affairs ministers and/or European affairs ministers), and not only the 
government  of  the  country  holding  the  EU  Council  Presidency,  visit  several  or  all  of  their 
counterparts and respective parliaments for an “exchange of views”.  
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process  that  those  EU  policy  constraints  transform  into  European  and  national 
political objectives. 
  Such  a  multi-level  political  negotiation  process  in  the  EU  allows  for  a 
continuous discussion of processes and outcomes. That permanent discussion in turn 
permits increased transparency of and participation in the entire process of European 
integration.  Moreover,  that  multi-level  political  negotiation  process  has  also 
repeatedly allowed for the creation of a national and European consensus for reform 
at the EU level. 
In this context, one might argue
31 that the objective of the realisation of 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  in  Europe  was  instrumental  for  creating  the 
necessary consensus to overcome specific interests in the pursuit of social welfare. 
This  was  not  just  economic  orthodoxy  (as  perceived  by  some  authors  -  see  for 
instance  Robert  Cox,  1997)  –  in  fact  politicians  (Delors,  together  with  Kohl, 
Mitterrand  and  Gonzalez,  among  others)  pushed  for  it  -,  but  rather  institution-
building as an answer to the challenges of globalisation. 
In fact, it is possible to say that the EMU process has not only increased the 
economic  sustainability  of  the  European  integration  process,  by  avoiding  the 
undesirable consequences of uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, but has also 
raised the quality of its democracy – not only in terms of efficiency but as well 
transparency and even participation and, one might add, effectiveness, to the extent 
that new challenges were brought under more democratic control.
32 This is because 
it has allowed for some new forms of political negotiation in establishing new goals 
and it is bringing into account a new common institution, the ECB.  
Previously,  when  monetary  policy  was  basically  set  out  by  the  German 
Central Bank for the entire EMS zone, national monetary authorities could not be 
held  accountable  for  the  implementation  of  monetary  policy,  devised  and 
implemented in the system’s anchor country, Germany. National governments (with 
the exception of Germany) could only be held accountable for having taken the 
decision (and sticking to it) of joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System. 
The challenge of EMU, one has to acknowledge, may have started as the 
importing of “bottom-up pressures”, meaning the ideas of some elites, epistemic 
communities, reflected by the European Commission, central bankers and monetary 
economists (also according to Jones, 2000, such influences reflected epistemological 
rather  than  distributive  considerations)  embraced  only  by  a  leading  fraction  but 
without  the  participation  of  most  of  the  national  populations.  However,  having 
involved  a  prolonged  period  of  multi-level  political  negotiation,  the  design  and 
implementation  of  EMU  allowed  for  increased  participation  of  the  European 
population. 
Furthermore,  the  European  Union  is  currently  in  a  process  of  transition 
towards a wider political union in Europe together with an increasingly important 
role of representative institutions. In such a situation, European institution-building, 
                                           
31 See for instance Jones, Frieden and Torres (1998) for the case of some Small Member States. 
32 See Erik Jones (2002) for a similar conclusion in regard to efficiency and transparency.  
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with more efficient and transparent bodies and even transnational political parties 
may be a way of reinforcing the democratic quality (and its reach) of the European 
integration  process,  namely  the  link  between  participation  and  “responsible 
representation” of the voters and the guarantee that the existing social structures 
remain open and accessible to pressures from below. 
EMU  was  a  good  example  of  a  process  of  a  continuous  multi-level 
negotiation during both the discussion of its very rules inscribed in the Maastricht 
treaty and its convergence phase. That phase included the implementation of the 
various national convergence programmes, the adoption of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) and other changes in domestic policy throughout several national, local 
and European elections. That meant a permanent discussion and a negotiation at 
different levels of government. One can also argue that the different referenda that 
have been held on that subject (yes or no political campaigns and debates and voting 
alternatives), by conditioning the project of EMU for some countries and, in the case 
of the first Danish and French referenda on the Treaty of Maastricht, its calendar for 
the entire European Union, have also triggered wide-spread political discussions. 
On  the  other  hand,  EMU  was  a  clear  case  in  point  of  extending  the 
democratic reach to areas so far beyond the national control by bringing into account 
at the EU level policies so far uncontrolled (exchange rate and monetary, and indeed 
macroeconomic,  policies)  at  the  national  level  (arguably  less  so  in  the  case  of 
Germany).  
In most EU countries European integration challenges such as Economic and 
Monetary Union have worked not only as mechanisms for economic stabilisation but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, as pre-requisites for structural reform and long-
term development.  
The responses to European integration challenges provide good examples of 
evolving  governance  in  the  EU  because  they  go  together  with  the  more  clearly 
perceived need for democratic control of its new institutions. In addition, they also 
allow for an increased participation of representative institutions and the civil society 
in the discussions that take place before the approval of treaty changes and their 
ratification about the goals of the envisaged reforms, i.e. on the type of model of 
society envisaged. 
Despite  the  fact that  Europe  does  neither have  (yet)  a  constitution nor  a 
government  and  that  it  suffers  the  impact  of  globalisation  on  national  political 
systems  (that  are  unable  to  deal  with  new  global  problems  without  sharing 
sovereignty),  one  may  argue  that  such  conditions  may  also  be  leading  to  an 
improvement of the democratic quality of EU governance. 
In fact, the European Union has been experiencing a permanent re-drafting 
of its treaties, necessary to accommodate important institutional changes (such as the 
Internal  Market,  EMU, Schengen  and the  communitarisation  of  other matters of 
justice and internal affairs) that involve an explicit transfer of national sovereignty to 
the Union level. At the time of each constitutional change the question of democracy 
is discussed both Europe-wide and at the level of each Member State, in some cases  
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in conjunction with a referendum and, especially in traditionally more centralised 
states, it is also focused on that very transfer of sovereignty.
33 
Moreover, with on the one hand a growing individualisation of society and 
the resulting loss in terms of the aggregation of interests and on the other hand the 
increased complexity of issues at stake (namely risks, one could say, using Ulrich 
Beck’s  terminology),  multi-level  political  negotiation  involving  many  different 
actors  is  a  rather  important  mechanism  for  democracy  which  referenda  cannot 
deliver.
34 
In  fact,  apparently  nation-  and/or  union-wide  referenda  provide  an 
opportunity for citizens’ increased participation and even transparency in the process 
of  decision-making.  However,  the  necessarily  simple  or  simplistic  nature  of  the 
questions, generally yes or no questions, does not really allow for more participation 
when complex issues are at stake. They may give the citizens the last word on some 
issue but SHUVH they do not guarantee the quality of their increased participation and 
obviously they may affect negatively the efficiency (outcomes) of the process. 
On the contrary, a continuous process of negotiation at different levels of 
government might allow for a permanent (and more transparent) discussion (and 
other forms of participation), even through various national and European elections 
(as mentioned above for the case of EMU). On the other hand, clear-cut decisions 
over clear-cut issues may be decided very efficiently through a referendum. The 
same is not valid though for more complex issues that cut across national interests: 
the probability of a continuous deadlock would be very high. Again, a multi-level 
political negotiation process may render policy-making more efficient by allowing 
for a continuous confrontation of positions at various levels of government, making 
it possible and easier to converge to an acceptable (for all and at the various levels of 
government) common position. 
It follows that national parliaments, the European Parliament and European 
citizens in general may have all become more aware of the need for more democratic 
control of new European institutions but also of the need of regaining democratic 
control  over  national  governments  and  institutions  that  have  become  more 
unaccountable through the process of globalisation. 
Therefore, despite the inexistence of a European constitution (as yet) and a 
European government, EU governance may not be hindering European democracy 
but rather extending it bringing in some new important features, such as new forms 
of participation, through the interaction of different institutions and citizens in that 
multi-level  political  negotiation  process.  The  role  of  national  and  European 
representative  (parliamentarian)  institutions  and  also  their  interaction  further 
enhances the transparency and effectiveness of EU governance.  
                                           
33 That transfer of sovereignty only does not involve its external affairs aspect because other sources 
of power (such as the United Nations, NATO or simply the United States) superior to that of the EU 
and its territory do exist and both European citizens and member states recognise that. Recent world 
events illustrate this point well. 
34 As Ulrich Beck (1992, p. 36) put it: poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic. In other words, as in 






In this section, I discuss the case of EMU from the perspective of creating 
credible monetary institutions, namely the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and a credible monetary constitution, 
also through a process of multi-level political negotiation. 
The case of EMU illustrates how EU policy constraints, to which a Member 
State could normally adapt rather slowly, may gradually (quite quickly sometimes) 
be  transforming  into  political  objectives.  The  adoption  of  national  convergence 
programmes was indeed a way of transforming EU policy constraints into common 
European and national objectives. This obviously increases policy effectiveness but 
it also allows for increased participation of national citizens in a European common 
project that internalises at the European level some externalities that arose from 
uncoordinated (and probably not perceived as such before the discussion of new 




Joining a monetary union based on institutions that deliver price stability
35 is, 
as stressed by the modern political economy literature, probably the best way to 
implement a solid strategy of sustained economic development. The reason is that 
this option, besides precluding many of the transition costs (economically speaking, 
the output losses of a disinflation strategy) of such a regime change, is also more 
transparent in terms of policy objectives. Actually, fixed exchange rates, unlike other 
policy targets, are easily observable by the public but also easily implemented by the 
authorities.
36 
In such a regime, the authorities raise the political costs of inflation because 
the public can constantly monitor their anti-inflation commitment and any different 
behaviour would imply a loss of competitiveness for the tradables sector. One should 
not forget, however, that exchange rate flexibility can only have a transitory impact 
and hence does not dispense the need for long-run real adjustment of a country’s 
economic structure (Torres, 1996). Besides, nominal exchange rate devaluations are 
totally ineffective if they cannot affect the relative price of domestic and foreign 
goods (the real exchange rate, a relative price).  
In fact, a small open economy tends to lose less (gain more) than a larger 
closed economy by giving up its monetary autonomy and joining in a monetary 
union with its trading partners. Foreign exchange transaction costs and exchange rate 
uncertainty tend to affect mainly small open economies. This is because a relatively 
                                           
35 By institutions that deliver price stability it is meant here not only the European Central Bank but 
also the monetary constitution of the EU (the ECB’s status) and other macroeconomic rules, such as 
the Stability and Growth Pact, etc., its RUGQXQJVSROLWLVFKH*UXQGVlW]H, one may say. In that sense and 
according to Douglass North (1990, p. 3, opening statement of Chapter I), “Institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction”. 
36 See Torres (1990).  
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important fraction of their trade is done with other countries and therefore they face 
large (and potentially unstable) foreign exchange markets. As the degree of openness 
increases, the benefits of adopting a common currency increase and the costs of 
relinquishing control over an autonomous exchange rate policy diminish. This is 
because a devaluation has a much stronger impact on the price level of a relatively 
open economy than on the price level of a relatively closed economy. 
In the case of the EU, such a project was also a way of insulating all of the 
European economies that had embarked on the EMU project from foreign exchange 
speculation, exchange rate volatility and serious currency misalignments. Those in 
turn could not only affect the macroeconomic stability of weaker currency countries 
and  the  competitiveness  of  stronger  currency  countries,  thereby  giving  rise  to 
protectionist claims and/or retaliations, but also put at stake the functioning of the 
Internal Market and indeed the entire European integration project.  
That argument was not trivial even for Germany since it hinged exactly on 
the  idea  of  protecting  the  internal  market  from  currency  misalignments.  Niels 
Thygesen  (1996)  further  develops  that  idea  claiming  that  protectionist  demands, 
arising from a fragmented currency system, would include industrial subsidies in the 
strong-currency countries. 
Furthermore, one could argue that, as a tendency, high inflation countries 
tend to gain more than low inflation countries from sharing their monetary autonomy 
in  a  common  monetary  institution.  Eliminating  inflation  through  the  sharing  of 
monetary sovereignty in a common credible (and upon its creation with expectations, 
and realistic chances, of becoming more accountable) institution such as the ECB 
and the abolition of different currencies, does away with the need to waste resources 
on hedging against exchange risks (and financial speculation). A common monetary 
institution  that  delivers  price  stability  is  therefore  a  two-fold  welfare  improving 
mechanism.
37 
  Adopting a credible monetary constitution was also a means of cancelling 
out  the  primacy  of  monetary  policy  over  other  more  important  concerns  facing 
society.  This  was  especially  true  for  countries  with  less  developed  fiscal  and 
monetary institutions like Greece, Portugal, Spain and even Italy (and in the future 
all new EU members). In that case, EMU was a means of getting rid of national 
currencies and all the economic jargon that goes with them and, consequently, the 
typical excuses that technocrats find to cling to power and implement all kinds of 
mercantilist policies in the name of short-term real convergence.
38 
                                           
37 The reason is that it internalises both the costs of excessive inflation and exchange rate instability. 
See Torres (1996) for a discussion. Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996) provide other arguments for the 
case of low inflation countries in the context of EMU. 
38 What, at a first glance, could be branded as a mere “new constitutionalism” approach in the 
interpretation of Martin Hewson and Timothy Sinclair (1999) - that is ring-fencing central banks 
from political interference with mandates to combat inflation – goes much further than that in the 
case of a common European monetary institution. In fact, the new monetary constitution of Europe, 
EMU, may be a way of avoiding the ring-fencing of many national authorities on monetary and 
financial  external  constraints  and  of  creating  the  necessity  –  and  the  conditions  -  for  increased 
transparency and accountability.  
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Not surprisingly, in the case of some EU (laggard) countries, those very 
policies,  which  have  been  pursued  until  now
39,  implied  a  sharp  deterioration  of 
social cohesion and the quality of life, undermining the long-term (sustainable) real 
convergence with the most developed regions of Europe. 
In other words: what could have been seen at the first glance as top-down 
(EU Commission and “statesmanship”) pressures were indeed a way through which 
some Member States regained some political control over monetary policy at the 
European level. 
In fact, in that way, those EU countries were able to bring into account at the 
EU  level  uncontrolled  transnational  forces,  such  as  the  permanent  threat  of 
speculation against weaker currencies within the EU, avoiding, in that way, serious 
currency misalignments that would endanger the entire European project. On the 
other hand, European citizens in those Member States got rid of many ills associated 





During the entire convergence period, however, few people presented EMU 
as a desirable political reform instead of an external constraint. For a long time, most 
politicians,  bureaucrats  and  even  economists  just  referred  to  it,  initially,  as  an 
objective rather unlikely to be realised and, later on, as an unavoidable development 
within the European Union.
40 Presented in this way, EMU could have been (and as a 
matter of fact was at different periods) easily blamed for all the policy errors made 
by  national  governments,  monetary  authorities  and  other  national  or  European 
institutions.  
In many instances, the EMU project was regarded as an unavoidable external 
constraint that went together with an exogenous political objective to which their 
political leaders had converged. Good examples of that perspective can be found in 
the reactions of some policy-makers, politicians and economists (such as the Group 
of  155)  in  Germany  expressing  their  reluctance  concerning  the  Bundesbank’s 
integration  into  “less  solid”  European  monetary  institutions  or  the  cross-party 
political resistance in Portugal, on the basis of the defence of national sovereignty, 
regarding the proposal to enshrine the objective of price stability in the Portuguese 
Constitution.
41 
The root of one of the chief misunderstandings about the entire process of 
monetary unification was in fact that many people tended to see it as a technocratic 
                                           
39  For  instance,  cohesion  countries,  namely  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain,  and  also  the  UK  and 
Ireland,  tend  to  opt  for  derogations  on  matters  such  as  energy  costs  (giving  wrong  economic 
incentives through lower energy costs to pollute more) in the name of short-term competitiveness. 
40 Depending on the perspective, the only way of tying Germany into the European Union, of 
achieving more political integration or, simply, of maintaining access to EU structural funds. 
41 In 1997, all political parties refused, on the grounds of national sovereignty, to enshrine in the 
Portuguese Constitution the objectives of EMU in the article concerning the central bank. At the 
same time, however (mind the contradiction!), they accepted to comply with whatever international 
rules (external constraints) Portugal would accept in the future.  
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obsession and/or an ideological defence of the market. At the same time, some of the 
forceful  opponents  of  EMU  happened  to  be  technocrats  (sometimes  diplomats, 
central bank employees and even Eurocrats) or ideological free-marketeers (as for 
example some economic advisers, conservatives in some countries (e.g., the UK), 
Keynesian-leftist  in  others  (for  instance  France  and  Portugal)  and  independent 
economists in Germany as well as in other European countries. 
Instead,  one  can  defend  the  idea  that  adopting  a  credible  monetary 
constitution is a means to do away with the primacy of monetary policy over more 
important concerns to society. However, in the event few people did present EMU as 
a desirable political reform instead of an external constraint.  
The decisive argument turned out to be of economic nature (by definition 
less relevant for countries such as Denmark, the UK and Sweden). It was that, in a 
multi-speed EMU, it would have been more difficult for the catching-up countries to 
converge, in the sense that by being left out of EMU’s third phase they risked to 
become more exposed (and indeed vulnerable) in the international financial markets. 
Note, however, that this reasoning already implicitly enshrines the idea of bringing 
into account previously uncontrolled economic forces such as speculation against 
weaker currencies within the EU. 
There  was  also  the  perception  -  which  may  have  constituted  a  decisive 
(political) argument – that it was important to qualify for accession to EMU right 
away since the core members could have become reluctant to enlarge the initial club 
(composed of (XURODQG founding members) both in the monetary sphere and in other 
domains of European integration. 
With  EMU,  the  new  European  co-decision  process,  the  forthcoming 
enlargement process and the prospect of a closer political union for a limited number 
of  countries  within  the  EU,  it  became  more  difficult  -  or  politically  much  less 
attractive – for EU countries in general and cohesion countries in particular to follow 
the old rule of asking for derogations on EU directives and/or for postponing any 
decisions concerning the future of common European institutions and policies. 
Experience suggests that the European integration process – and in particular 
the need to perform sufficiently well to be part of the inner political core, especially 
at the time of each country’s presidency - provides member countries with a good 
incentive to leap forward and embark on a more proactive policy stance. This is 
especially the case for countries for which European integration is at the core of their 
development  strategy.  In  this  context  it  is  illustrative  that  it  was  during  the 
Portuguese presidency of the EU in 1992 that the national currency, the HVFXGR, 
joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS and that domestic capital 
controls were completely liberalised. The same had happened in the case of the 
Spanish presidency of the EU in 1989, when the SHVHWD joined the ERM just a few 
days before the European Council of Madrid accepted the Delors Report on EMU. 
Very few people had expected that Portugal and Spain, not to mention Italy, 
could meet the Maastricht criteria on time to join EMU from its very inception.
42 
                                           
42 Greece also managed to join EMU in 2001 two years after the beginning of its third phase but still 
one year before the replacement of all national currencies by euro coins and bills.  
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One, if not the main, reason for this disbelief had to do with the so-called systemic 
deficiencies  of  their  political  and  administrative  institutions.  Those  deficiencies, 
which did exist, were partly overcome thanks to importance of the challenge that the 
European  integration  process,  in  particular  the  objective  of  EMU,  constituted 
(especially) for (catching-up) member countries and to which their policies had to 
live up. 
What I have tried to demonstrate by means of the example of EMU is that 
EU  challenges  and  governance  at  the  EU  level,  by  transforming  into  national 
political objectives, make reform possible and more effective. At the same time the 
process in which such challenges are raised to national political objectives becomes 
more transparent, allowing for increased participation of citizens, non-governmental 
organisations and other actors. 
European  integration  challenges  such  as  Economic  and  Monetary  Union 
condition then the process of EU governance because they foster a clearer perception 
of the need for democratic control of its new institutions. Additionally, they allow 
for a new role of representative (parliamentary) institutions and the civil society in 
the  discussions  that  take  place  before  the  approval  of  treaty  changes  and  their 
ratification about the goals of the model of society envisaged at both the European 






The  challenges  posed  by  European  integration  process  determine  a 
continuously evolving governance in the EU because of the more clearly perceived 
need for democratic control of its new institutions and of the way in which policies 
are  formulated.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  EU  policies  and  the  quality  of 
democracy  in  the  process  of  European  integration  can  be  enhanced  if  the 
intergovernmental mode of governance gives way to the interaction of representative 
institutions at different levels and with the civil society. 
As shown in the paper, using the example of EMU (the making of its rules 
and the overseeing of the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy), that interaction can 
indeed allow for more participated and transparent modes of governance. Besides the 
intergovernmental mode of governance and in addition to supranational regulation, 
these new modes of governance include: joint decision-making, as is the case of the 
Single  Market,  and  policy  coordination,  as  is  the  case  of  the  open  method  of 
coordination of economic affairs (BEPG) or employment policy (EES). 
Recently, especially since the Lisbon European Council of 2000 that gave 
rise to the open method of coordination, there has bean an increasing interest in this 
latter  new  mode  of  governance  (policy  coordination)  aimed  at  improving  the 
problem-solving  capability  of  the  European  Union  through  policy  coordination 
without  binding  rules.  For  some  authors,  as  for  instance  Scharpf  (2001),  the 
development of these new instruments of policy coordination such as the OMC are a  
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pragmatic but credible alternative to the Community method of integration (see also 
Héritier, 2002) that does not face any efficiency-legitimacy trade-off.  
This  paper  did  not  take  up  that  popular  and  interesting  line  of  research. 
Rather, it explores a much less popular line of research, challenging the common 
wisdom on the democratic deficit of the European Union and on the efficiency-
legitimacy trade-off. It tried to show that even a shift from an intergovernmental 
form of governance to supranational regulation (Economic and Monetary Union) 
form of governance not only does away with such a trade-off but rather enhances the 
democratic quality and effectiveness of European governance. 
This  is  mainly  due  to  the  yet  very  much  neglected  phenomenon  of  the 
interaction between representative institutions at different levels in the European 
Union and also to the better studied participatory and deliberative processes (in this 
case the building-up of EMU) that have characterised supranational regulation. 
The emerging role of the European Parliament in enhancing the democratic 
accountability of the decision-making in supranational regulation (monetary policy) 
has proved quite powerful at avoiding such a trade-off and indeed at improving 
efficiency  (allowing  for  the  internalisation  at  the  Union  level  of  different 
externalities)  and  democracy  (transparency  and  accountability)  in  European 
governance. 
The democratic accountability of governance in the EU increased very much 
as  the  direct  result  of  the  making  of  EMU  (democratic  delegation  of  executive 
powers by the European Council and the EU Council of Ministers to the ECB). That 
democratic accountability has however been also substantially enhanced thanks to 
the emerging (and still evolving) role of the European Parliament as a principal in 
regard to the European Central Bank. 
That new role of the EP materialised because of the change in nature of 
delegation, i.e. the initial principal (the Council) delegated to an agent (the ECB) in 
order for the agent to control its behaviour with regard to monetary policy. That led 
to a change in the assignment between agents and principals. The new principal (still 
in the making one could argue) has also allowed for increased participation in and 
deliberation on the discussions about the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB, 
contributing in this way to its greater transparency. These discussions have involved 
monetary  policy  experts  and  economists  with  different  perspectives  as  well  as 
national parliaments. National MPs can in turn better understand and discuss the 
appropriate  policy  mix  in  their  own  countries,  with  both  national  central  bank 
governors and members of the national government that is accountable to them. 
But the interest of looking at the European model lies also in the fact that it is 
reinventing itself continuously as the process of European integration deepens - it is 
not a mere transposition of the domestic democracy to the Union level. That is why 
it is possible to enhance the democratic quality of governance through the evolving 
process of multi-level political negotiation that has emerged in the EU.  
The European integration process is responding to the globalisation process 
and also to the growing individualisation and complexity of society through the 
development  of  these  new  multi-level  negotiation  mechanisms,  namely  the 
interaction of the different national European parliaments with each other and with  
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the European Parliament, the respective governments, the European Commission 
and  other  European  institutions  and  civil  society.  In  fact,  today,  representative 
institutions (parliaments) might be unable to control international governance but 
they may be in the process of regaining some control over European governance.
43 
As a matter of fact, representative institutions, and especially the European 
Parliament by its very nature, are instrumental for making institutions such as the 
ECB  more  accountable  and  the  process  of  policy-making  more  transparent  and 
participated, while guaranteeing a balance between processes and outcomes. The 
European Parliament is indeed in the best position to fulfil the role of a principal that 
the European Council and/or the Council of Ministers, as intergovernmental bodies, 
can difficultly exercise. 
The European Parliament’s overseeing of EU institutions, such as the ECB, 
clearly contributes to an increased transparency and accountability of the system. 
Moreover, the interaction and collaboration between the European Parliament and 
national parliaments in the EU is a way of allowing for increased participation and of 
enhancing its representative quality. 
By  enhancing  the  accountability  of  EU  institutions,  common  policies, 
namely  monetary  policy,  become  more  effective  (smooth)  in  the  long  run.  By 
allowing  for  an  increased  participation  of  representative  institutions  (national 
parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament)  in  the  formulation  of  other  common 
policies, such as environmental policies, national vested interests can be more easily 
overcome  and  a  common  position  (internalising  some  externalities)  has  a  better 
chance to be reached in the EU. 
Let me take up an argument put forward by Anthony McGrew (2000) that a 
world government is not politically attainable and/or desirable (under the present 
conditions, one might add). In that case, a possible solution for the incapacity of 
national democratic institutions to regulate globalisation is to pool sovereignty in a 
way  that  goes  beyond  the  notion  of  a  mere  set  of  pluralistic  arrangements  that 
characterise global governance. The EU already pools sovereignty clearly beyond 
such a set of pluralistic arrangements, as stated by Article 1 of the TEU (as revised 
by the Amsterdam Treaty): “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as 
openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”. On the other hand, 
sovereignty-sharing in the European Union can only involve a more powerful notion 
of legal authority, provided that Member States also share some common political 
values. That is also the case for the EU, as stated in Article 6 of the TEU (as revised 
by  the  Amsterdam  Treaty):  “The  Union  is  founded  on  the  principles  of  liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States” 
In  fact,  the  process  of  integration  and  decision-making  in  the  European 
Union is probably the only case of sovereignty-sharing that has proceeded steadily 
                                           
43 Take the case of the reluctant but inevitable and quite predictable acceptance by governments and 
political parties alike of the model of the convention of 2003/04, already used before for drafting the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights.  That  may  also  reflect  the  fact  that  the  European  co-decision 
procedure is in practice reinforcing the role of national parliaments and indeed democracy in the EU.  
 
28
up to a point where some multi-level governance can be already regarded as a polity. 
The on-going qualitative change of governance in the EU, i.e. the building-up of new 
European institutions and the development of new policy instruments devised at the 
European  level,  can  be seen  as  a  way  of  extending  (and  enhancing)  democracy 
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